In 1987, the US Supreme Court ruled in Cardoza-Fonseca that the well-founded fear of persecution standard under the 1980 Refugee Act is different from and more generous than that of "clear probability", or balance of probability, which had been imposed by administrative authorities. This article reviews subsequent developments in asylum decision-making at the Board of Immigration Appeals, and contrasts it with the jurisprudence of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Many anticipated that the Supreme Court decision would lead to increasing attention to issues of credibility and discretion; in fact, although credibility remains important, the scope of discretion has been narrowed, and more restrictive approaches to the.conceptions of persecution and political opinion have been adopted. The article illustrates the contrasting approach of the Ninth Circuit which, it argues, is more in tune with political realities. If conflict with the Court is to be avoided, the authors suggest that the Board of Immigration Appeals may well have to engage more directly and more deeply in political and human rights judgments relating to countries of origin.
Introduction
Just over one year ago, the United States Supreme Court gave its decision in INS v. 1 holding that the standard of proof in Even when Cardoza-Fonseca was first decided, it was not clear to many observers that the Court's ruling would result in a more generous asylum policy. 7 Following the decision, some experienced immigration practitioners, as well as government officials, predicted that a major effect of the liberalization of the standard of proof would be an increased emphasis on the credibility determination 8 (an area over which courts have traditionally deferred to administrative and other first-tier decisionmakers), and on discretionary denials for those who had established eligibility for asylum under the well-founded fear standard. A focus on credibility and discretion in asylum cases seemed both likely or, at least, permissible under the Court's holding in Cardoza-Fonseca, 9 and consistent with trends in Board decision-making before the Cardoza-Fonseca opinion was issued.'" Both credibility and discretion based denials would result in decisions turning, to a large extent, on issues tangential to the underlying claim of persecution. In the case of credibility based rulings, the applicant's testimony could be dismissed as generally untrustworthy and unbelievable: therefore, no substantive inquiry would be necessary into the merits of his or her claim. Where discretion was in issue, a claim could be denied either despite the establishment of a well-founded fear, or irrespective of it." residing within its jurisdiction and the presence of a major Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention center in El Centro, California. The Ninth Circuit encompasses the western states of California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. California is believed to have the largest undocumented non-national population of any state in the United States; in particular, 350,000-400,000 Central Americans, many ofwhom seek asylum in the United States, are believed to live there. Most potential asylum-seekers from Central America have arrived in the United States since conflicts in the region increased in 1979 -1980 . See San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 28,1985 , at 1, col. 1. Id. Dec. 24,1985 , at 1, col. 1. From 1980 -1986 Americans were the petitioners in almost two-thirds of the reported asylum and withholding ofdeportation cases in the Ninth Circuit. In 1985 alone, almost ninety per cent of the unreported asylum and withholding cases concerned petitions for review by Central Americans.
" The Executive Office of Immigration Review does not publish statistics on the outcomes of asylum decisions and thus the most telling evidence of the impact of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision remains unavailable. 8 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court recognized that the applicant's subjective fear is an explicit and important aspect of the asylum determination. In interpreting the statutory 'well-founded fear' language, the Court stated '[t]hat the fear must be "well-founded" does not alter the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs. . .' 485 U.S.-, 107 S. Ct. at 1213 Ct. at (1987 . Credibility clearly is a critical element in the evaluation of subjective fear.
9 The Court in Cardoza-Fonseca discussed similarities between the grant of discretionary authority in asylum, and in various forms of discretionary deportation relief, where the Court generally has given broad range to the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. See 485 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1220 Ct. at (1987 ; Butsee Anker supra note 2 at note 194 and accompanying text (analysing the Court's decision as consistent with a limited conception of the role of discretion in asylum).
o See generally Anker, supra note 2. " See e.g. Matter of Salim 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (denying asylum on discretionary grounds despite the fact that the applicant had established eligibility based on his persecution claim). Like asylum, most forms of discretionary relief are divisible between, on the one hand, statutory eligibility requirements; and, on the other hand, a further provision for the actual Instead, what has happened since Cardoza-Fonseca is a reversal of the previous trend. In a major turnaround, the Board has significantly limited the scope of discretion to deny asylum to eligible applicants. Although it has continued to emphasize the importance of the credibility determination, the Board has shifted the focus to credibility problems that are both major and central to the applicant's claims. Indeed, fewer administrative decisions may rest exclusively-or explicitly-on an assessment of the applicant's credibility. Rather than discretion or credibility, the Board has utilized another basis for denying many asylum claims; namely, a narrowing conception of persecution and political opinion under the statute. Denial on the merits, while hardly a new premise for Board decisions, 12 has been more frequently relied upon and more fully elaborated in post-Cardoza-Fonseca decisions. The Board's more restrictive and often context-blind view of political opinion and persecution has once again, as in Cardoza-Fonseca, brought the Board into conflict with the federal courts, or more particularly with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In contrast to the Board's approach, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the statutory terminology to accommodate the realities of political conflicts and politically-motivated persecution in Central American and Caribbean nations. 1 3
Discretionary Denial: A New Emphasis on Balancing and An Affirmative Presumption
Before Cardoza-Fonseca, the Board had established a number of precedents which had the effect of making most misrepresentations in the entry process by an asylum applicant a very strong negative discretionary factor, that weighed heavily towards denial of asylum as a matter of discretion.' 4 Use of a false passport to gain airline passage, or misexercise of discretion. The alien must establish statutory eligibility without which discretion cannot be exercised. However, reliefcan be denied on discretionary grounds without a finding on eligibility. See INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 44,449-50 (1985) ; INSv. Bagamasbad, 429 US. 24,26 (1976) (per curiam) .
12 For example, in Matter ofAcosta, a pre-Cardoza-Fonseca Board decision dealing comprehensively with a variety of issues under the asylum statute, the Board was already applying a strict interpretation to the meaning ofpolitical opinion. '[ihe requirement of "persecution on account of political opinion" refers not to the ultimate political end that may be served by persecution but to the beliefheld by an individual that causes him to be the object of the persecution.' Int. Dec. No. 2986 at 26 (BIA 1985 . After Cardoza-Fonseca, the Board overruled that aspect of Acosta equating the well-founded fear and clear probability standards, but approved the general definition of persecution articulated in that decision. Matter of Mogharrabi Int. Dec. No. 3028 at 11 (BIA 1987 representations to U.S. officials to gain access to the United States and the asylum process, were virtually per se bases for denial of asylum as a matter of discretion, even where the applicant established a 'clear probability' of persecution for the purpose of obtaining withholding of deportation relief under section 243(h) of the Act. The Board also viewed any contact that the applicant had with a third country, no matter how minimal, as a discretionary basis for denial of asylum. Rather than enter or attempt to enter the United States, the Board held in effect that most asylum applicants could or should use the overseas U.S. refugee admissions process and be subject to the numerical and nationality limitations of those programmes. Indeed, in unpublished decisions, the Board seemed to hold that any irregularity in the manner of entry of an asylum applicant-including entry without authorized status, use of a smuggler (a factor inevitably associated with most Central American claims), or 'avoidance' of the overseas process (even where, as in Central America, there was no programme for overseas admission)-created a presumption of denial on discretionary grounds.
5
This trend was substantially modified in late 1987, with the decision in Matter of Pula. 16 The Board held that the applicant's use of a false passport was only one factor to be weighed in the discretionary balance. It also found that, in making the discretionary determination, the adjudicator must consider the quality of the applicant's contact and status in any third country through which he travelled, or in which he resided, before coming to the United States to apply for asylum. Most importantly, Pula effectively reversed the negative bias of previous decisions. In contrast with its earlier position that any misrepresentation created a presumption of denial, the Board in Pula effectively adopted an affirmative presumption, holding that 'the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors." 7 This limit on discretion had been advocated in various public policy forums, before the Board and in federal courts. United States; it is clear, however, that the Board has retreated from its earlier position that any manner of entry factor can provide a virtually automatic basis for denial of asylum on discretionary grounds. 19
Credibility: New Problems
The Board's post-Cardoza view of the credibility determination has also clearly changed, but far less dramatically than its reassessment in Pula of the discretionary aspect of asylum. Unlike discretion, credibility continues as an important basis for denial, but the focus and emphasis have shifted. In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's ruling, the Board began to move in a positive direction, holding that negative credibility rulings could not be based on testimonial discrepancies, or misrepresentations peripheral to the central concern of asylum: the claim of persecution itself. But more recently, the Board has begun to slever the credibility determination from the assessment of the persecution claim, thereby avoiding making explicit credibility rulings. This approach is fundamentally problematic, and conflicts with Ninth Circuit decisions which have consistently acknowledged the importance ofan evaluation of credibility to a ruling on the merits of the asylum claim.
The Cardoza-Fonseca decision focused on the subjective fear of the applicant as a critical element in establishing a well-founded fear of persecution. 20 A determination of the credibility of the applicant is fundamental in that context; a critical question is the evaluation of, and weight to be accorded to, the applicant's own testimony, where it is essentially the only evidence produced in support of the persecution claim. 2 ' Before Cardoza-Fonseca was decided, the Board had suggested that an applicant's own testimony might be sufficient to sustain an asylum claim. 2 In Matter of Mogharrabi, 3 the Board's first precedent decision following Cardoza-Fonseca, the Board seemed to lay to rest any lingering notion that an applicant's uncorroborated testimony can be 19 For a critique of the limitations of Pula, see generaly Anker supra note 2. As this article goes to press, there are some indications that the Board is diluting the impact of Pula, See e.g. In Re Chavdagy, A26639909 (unpublished dec.) (BIA 1988) (negative factors for discretionary denial of Indian Hindu's asylum application included lack of evidence of present persecution, despite evidence ofpast persecution; and the applicant's 'safe haven' in Iran, despite the lack of a right to remain and his forced departure from Iran because of the government's mistreatment of Hindus). 20 485 U.S.-, 107 S. Ct. at 1213; see supra note 8. 21 There is an important distinction between the question ofwhether the testimony will satisfy the burden of proof in asylum, and whether that testimony is credible and believable. Court opinions often confuse determinations ofcredibility with an assessment ofthe applicant's ability to satisfy the burden of proof, engaging in the process of weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than evaluating the actual believability of the applicant's testimony. [73] ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 187 dismissed as inherently self-serving. "4 The Court's emphasis on subjective fear and the relative generosity of the asylum statute, to some extent favour giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt when evaluating and weighing his or her testimony. Although the Board did not clearly embrace this 'benefit of the doubt' approach, in Mogharrabi the Board, for the first time, did clearly hold that
[T]he lack of [corroborative] evidence will not necessarily be fatal to the application. The alien's own testimony may in some cases be the only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear 25
The immediate impact of Cardoza-Fonseca on the Board's view of credibility is evident from a comparison of the unpublished credibility rulings of the Board in 1985 with a sampling of those issued in 1987 after the Supreme Court's decision. 26 A 1985 study of unpublished Board asylum and withholding ofdeportation decisions concluded that 'throughout the unpublished caselaw, considerations peripheral to the alien's testimony regarding the persecution claim itself are factored into the credibility determination.' 2 7 In 1985 Board decisions, for example, a widely cited reason for negative credibility findings was the same factor that counted against the applicant on discretion. The Board considered the applicant's lies to INS officials or commission of some misrepresentation in the entry process as evidence of 'little regard for the truth', so that testimony as to the merits of the persecution claim could be largely discounted. In contrast, 'past dishonesty' was not a significant credibility factor in any of the 1987 cases reviewed. Instead, inconsistencies between the testimony and the written application, or contradictory testimony, were the major credibility related reasons for denials in the sample of post-Cardoza cases. Moreover, whereas earlier cases had focused on inconsistencies that were often peripheral to the applicant's claim, the 1987 decisions have held, at least in principle, that 'trivial' inconsistencies in the alien's testimony, unrelated to his or her 'overall claim of persecution', are insufficient to discredit an otherwise 'detailed, believable account of events'. 28 This change in the Board's approach to credibility represents an effort to conform to the Supreme Court's ruling, as well as to Ninth Circuitjurisprudence, such as Plateros-Cortez v. INS, in which the Court of Appeals addressed inconsistencies as a basis for an adverse credibility ruling. 29 In that case, the Board's decision denying asylum was premised on the applicant's inconsistent statements regarding the date of his departure from El Salvador, the date of his prior deportation from the United States, and the site of the assassination ofhis employer. The court reversed and found the applicant eligible for asylum, ruling that these inconsistencies had 'little or no relevance to the merits' of the applicant's case-that he had been detained, tortured and threatened in El Salvador. 30 This view-that inconsistencies not central to the persecution claim cannot form the basis for a negative credibility ruling-was recently reinforced in In the Board's decision, asylum was denied on the basis of an adverse credibility ruling by the Immigration Judge, which arose from conflicts between testimony of the applicant and that of his cousin regarding the year of a death squad action against them, the length of time the men hid from the death squad, and whether payment was made for their accommodation during hiding. Overruling the Immigration Judge and the Board, the court held that these were minor inconsistencies 'which reveal nothing about an asylum applicant's fear for his safety.' 3 2 Ninth Circuit decisions not only hold that some inconsistencies or misrepresentations are irrelevant to the applicant's persecution claim. They also recognize that the experience of fleeing persecution creates [75] ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 189 psychological pressures that affect the applicant's behaviour-and may even motivate the applicant to lie-when confronted by governmental authorities in the United States. In Turcios v. INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of asylum where the Salvadoran applicant had lied about his nationality, telling immigration officials that he was Mexican. 3 The court ruled that this misrepresentation should not adversely affect the assessment of his credibility with respect to the persecution claim. The context showed that the applicant lied in order to be deported to Mexico; this lent credibility to his claim; and was consistent with his overriding fear of deportation to El Salvador and re-exposure to persecution. 4 As will be discussed below, this sensitivity to and awareness of the context of political repression and its impact on the individual is one of the hallmarks of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, apparent also in its interpretation of 'political opinion' under the statute.
In some important respects, the Board has successfully adjusted its view of credibility to Ninth Circuit decisions and the Supreme Court's ruling, but more recent trends indicate a new and problematic direction. The Board has begun to de-emphasize credibility; fewer decisions seem to rely exclusively on a negative credibility assessment. In a recent precedent decision upholding a denial of asylum, the Board held that an Immigration Judge need not make an explicit credibility ruling.' This may precipitate a new conflict with the Ninth Circuit, whose rulings require a reversal and remand to the Board for credibility findings whenever the Board expressly abstains from deciding the credibility issue. 3 6 The court also will require a remand to the Board when it cannot determine the basis of the Board's ruling. 3 7 One danger in the Board's current position is that the assessment of credibility may become an implicit, rather than a stated basis for negative rulings in asylum cases. Credibility will continue to be important in asylum decision-making, but the possibility of 'hidden' credibility rulings raises serious problems. Cross-cultural misunderstandings and translation errors can have a critical impact on the credibility determination. 38 1207 (1987) .
However, the court has stated that 'when the Board's decision is silent on the question of credibility, and the Board has fully explained the rationale behind its decision, we will presume that the Board found the petitioner credible, and proceed to review the Board's decision. adjudicatory process, that can be determinative of the outcome in an asylum case where the central focus is on an applicant's subjective fear, often based solely on his or her uncorroborated testimony.
In the light of the Cardoza-Fonseca decision, the Board's de-emphasis of discretion and credibility is surprising. Instead of these as principal bases for denials, the Board in recent months has instead based most negative decisions on a narrowing interpretation of the meaning of political opinion and persecution under the Act.
Narrowing Conception of the Meaning of Persecution and Political Opinion: The Board and the Ninth Circuit Conflict
In the past eight years, the Ninth Circuit has elaborated the concept of 'political opinion', one of the five statutory bases for asylum. In a series of cases, the court has confronted new forms of political persecution experienced by persons fleeing El Salvador, and other Central American and Caribbean nations. In consequence, the court no longer necessarily requires evidence of overt political acts, in order for an applicant to establish that his or her feared persecution is on account of political opinion.
9
First, in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, the court ruled that political neutrality-the deliberate refusal tojoin either side in the civil war in El Salvador-constituted a 'political opinion.' 4 0 It held that the interpretation of 'political opinion' under the statute must comprehend the widespread political violence in El Salvador, and the particular forms of political repression and victimization in that country. The court stated that 'the general climate of uncontrolled violence in El Salvador' reinforced the applicant's fear of threats by the guerrillas to harm him if he did not assist them. 4 ' The Board, in contrast, had found that the threat to Bolanos should be taken less seriously, because it was simply 'representative' of the general level of violence in El Salvador. 42 The court castigated the Board for this conclusion, and for its 'ability to turn logic on its head.' 4 3 In subsequent decisions, the court again analysed the specific context of violence in El Salvador in assessing the merits of the applicant's claim. In Argueta v. INS, for example, the court held that an applicant can establish a political position of neutrality, based on threats made against him by death squads in El Salvador. 44 In Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, the court further developed its analysis, and held that an individual can be persecuted because of the govern-"9 See e.g. Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259 (Cir. 1984 Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1984 . 40 767 F.2d 1277 40 767 F.2d , 1286 40 767 F.2d -7 (9th Cir. 1985 The decision in Hernandez-Ortiz is noteworthy because of its realistic assessment of the nature of political persecution in El Salvador, and for the court's effort to translate that reality into legal doctrine. Ms Hernandez-Ortiz, like many other Salvadorans, alleged fear of persecution, in part, because of acts of harassment and terror against her family. Instead of dismissing these incidents as tenuously connected to the applicant, as the Board had done, the court held that, in the context of the Salvadoran conflict, the government's actions against her family were politically motivated. 4 7 The court reaffirmed this reasoning in its recent ruling in Desir v. INS. 4 8 Here, the Board had denied asylum, characterizing beatings, imprisonment and assault by Haitian Ton Ton Macoutes for the purposes of extortion as a personal conflict. The court overruled, held that these actions did constitute persecution under the Act, and declared, the Haitian government under Duvalier operated as a 'kleptocracy' or government by thievery, from the highest to the lowest level. The Ton Ton Macoutes, an elaborate network of official and semi-official security forces... formed the heart of the system .... Because the Macoutes are an organization created for political purposes, they bring politics to the villages of Haiti. To challenge the extortion by which the Macoutes exist, is to challenge the underpinnings of the political system. 49 The court ruled that the Haitian applicant's refusal to accede to extortion demands by the Ton Ton Macoutes, in the context of the political situation in Haiti, was an act that could be 'perceived as disloyal and subversive'. It held that 'whether the political opinion is actually held or implied makes little difference where the alien's life is equally at risk.' 5°4 5 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985 Lazo-Majano V. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987 ) (holding that a threat by a military leader to report the victim as subversive constituted an imputed political opinion. But see, Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987 ) (restricting the imputed political opinion concept to 'extreme' circumstances).
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IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW REVIEW [78] One important issue that has emerged in many recent Salvadoran cases, closely related to the notion of imputed political opinion, is whether the statutory concept of persecution 5 1 encompasses involuntary recruitment by non-governmental opposition forces. Many Salvadoran claims involve an individual who did not want to take sides in the Salvadoran civil war, but who was forcibly recruited by the guerrillas. In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that forced recruitment in these circumstances is a 'clear deprivation of liberty' and 'tantamount to kidnapping.' 52 In contrast, the Board has found that forced recruitment by the guerrillas is a normal occurrence in civil war and even, in some sense, justifiable. In Matter of Maldonaldo-Cruz, the Board denied asylum to an applicant who testified that he and a friend were kidnapped by the guerrillas and forced to participate in an operation against his village. His friend tried to escape and was killed. Maldonaldo-Cruz then escaped and was subsequently informed that the guerrillas were looking for him. His claim to asylum was based on fear of persecution by the guerrillas, as well as by the military forces, which he said would persecute him because they believed he was now allied with the guerrillas.
3
The Board apparently did not dispute the applicant's assertion that the threat to his life from the guerrillas was realistic. Instead, it reasoned that any harm he would suffer 'is part of a military policy of the guerrilla organization, inherent in the nature of the organization 5 4 and not on account of his imputed political opinion or any desire on the guerrillas' part to persecute. 5 5 The Board analogized the guerrillas to a country which has established rules of military conduct and has a 'right ... to punish those who violate them.' 5 6 The Board reasoned further "' The Board has held that the term persecution is centrally concerned with the overt political beliefs and actions ofthe victim, and its test for persecution based on political opinion is set forth in Matter ofAcosta, Int. Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985) . That case held that the applicant's evidence must establish that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means ofpunishment ofsome sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability ofpunishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien. Id at 22. In Matter of Mogharrabi, the only modification ofthis test which the Board felt was required by the liberalization of the standard ofprooffor asylum in Cardoza-Fonseca was the omission of the word 'easily' from the second requirement. Int. Dec. No. 3028 at 9. 52 Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 , 1232 (9th Cir. 1988 ). 53 Int. Dec. No. 3041 (BIA 1988 ).
-Id. at 7. " 'The respondent's problem is not that the guerrillas are motivated to hate him because of political views they "impute" to him, but rather it is that he has breached their discipline in a way that cannot remain unpunished.' Id. at 12. The Board reasoned that '[e]ven though guerrillas may have the political strategy ofoverthrowing the government by military means, this does not mean that they cannot have objectives within that political strategy which are attained by acts of violence, but whose motivation is not related to any desire to persecute.' Id. at 7. 56 Id. at 12.
[79] ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 193 that '[t]here is an implicit presumption of a legitimate basis for punishment.' 57 As to Maldonaldo-Gruz' claim that the government would persecute him because of his unwilling involvement with the guerrillas, the Board held that If the government of El Salvador has received information implicating the Respondent as a guerilla, then it has a legitimate right to seek him out and determine whether he is indeed involved with such an organization ... If a citizen of the United States is alleged to belong to a clandestine organization which is operating in the United States and is engaged in violent activity to further its political goal, federal authorities would properly seek him out. The Government of El Salvador has a legitimate right to take similar action. 58
What is most disturbing about this most recent interpretation of persecution is the Board's efforts to justify governmental, and even guerrilla repression, as inevitable and even legitimate in the context of a civil war. The Board's position comes close to holding that the more pervasive the violence-and perhaps incidents of repression-within a country, the more difficult it will be to prove an individualized persecution claim. 59 The Board has attempted to define persecution based on political opinion exclusively in terms of the individual and of the subjective political motives of the alleged persecutor and victim. In Maldonaldo-Cruz and other Salvadoran and Haitian cases, the Board has insisted on assessing these individual motivations, while apparently avoiding ajudgment on the human rights conditions in the country from which the applicant has fled. In Maldonaldo-Cruz, the Board found that the actions of the Salvadoran government were legitimate, but gave no ruling regarding the human rights record of the Salvadoran government and its military and paramilitary forces. It held, in effect, that governments have the right to detain and question suspected members of armed resistance movements, and guerrilla movements have a right to recruit members; whatever punishment is meted out to deserters is not politically motivated. In so holding, the Board ignored critical facts in Maldonaldo-Gruz' case. Maldonaldo-Cruz claimed that he had not only been forcibly recruited, but also faced death because of his desertion from guerrilla ranks. He claimed not only that he faced detention and questioning by the government because of his involuntary association with the guerrillas, but also death because of his suspected affiliation. 60 By ignoring these facts, the Board purported to make a neutral and general judgment about the legitimacy of governmental action. Yet, in s Id. at 13. 5" Id. at 13-14. 59 This is precisely the approach criticized by the Ninth Circuit in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 , 1281 -5 (9th Cir. 1984 
Conclusion
The effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in Cardoza-Fonseca on decisionmaking at the Board of Immigration Appeals is an important and fascinating example of administrative response to judicial supervision. On the one hand, Cardoza-Fonseca has clearly resulted in some refocusing of the major bases for decisions in asylum cases. On the other hand, it is not clear that the Supreme Court's decision has resulted in any substantial change in the numbers and kinds of cases in which asylum has been granted or denied.
Many commentators predicted that, after the Supreme Court's liberalization of the standard of proof, the Board would move towards discretionary and credibility-based denials; with more cases turning on issues tangential to the persecution claim itself. Instead, recent Board decisions have focused on the statutory legal standards: the meaning of persecution and political opinion. The Board's jurisprudence contrasts sharply with that of the Ninth Circuit, which has interpreted these statutory standards in a manner sensitive to both political context and individual circumstances. 68 If further conflict with the Ninth Circuit is to be avoided, the Board may well be obliged to engage itself more directly and more deeply in the normative political and human rights judgments that have long been the central dilemma of United States asylum policy.
Resume
En 1987, la Cour supreme de Etats Unis a statuE lors de 1'affaire Cordoza-Fonseca que le principe d'une crainte fonde de persecution aux termes de la Loi de 1980 sur les rrfugirs est differente et plus grnrreuse que la rbgle de la probabilit6 claire ou de la probabilit6 relative appliqure par les autoritrs administratives. Cet article passe en revue les drveloppements ult~rieurs en matibre de drcisions concernant l'asile au sein du 'Board of Immigration Appeals' et met en parallble la jurisprudence de Ia Cour d'Appel des Etats-Unis pour le 'Ninth Circuit'. Nombre de personnes pensaient que la drcision de la Cour supreme se traduirait par une attention accrue aux problkmes de la ' The Board's refusal to apply Ninth Circuit rulings regarding the applicability of the 'wellfounded fear' of persecution standard of proof to asylum adjudications ultimately led to a direct confrontation with the court of appeals in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985 , aff'd480 U.S.-, 107 S. Ct. 1207 Ct. (1987 . In that case, the Ninth Circuit invoked the fundamental doctrine enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803, that the executive branch is bound to follow rulings of law by the federal judiciary: see Marbug v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). In the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca (ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court), the court castigated the Board for refusing to follow the circuit court decisions: 767 F.2d at 1454. When that same case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun more broadly chastized the immigration agencies for 'years of seemingly purposeful blindness' in grappling with a coherent formulation of the well-founded fear standard: INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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[82] cr~dibilitE et de ]a discretion; en fait, bien que la cr~dibilit6 reste importante, la port~e de la discr6tion a 6t6 r6duite, et des approches plus restrictives aux concepts de ]a pers6cution et de I'opinion politique ont 6t6 adopt6es. L'article illustre I'approche differente du 'Ninth Circuit' qui, L son sens, s'harmonise mieux avec les r~alit6s politiques. Pour 6viter tout conflit avec la Cour, l'auteur suggere que le 'Board of Immigration Appeals' s'engage plus directement et plus r6solument a porter des jugements politiques et 1 prendre position sur le respect des droits de l'homme dans les pays d'origine.
Resumen
En 1987, la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos, con ocasi6n del caso Cardoza-Fonseca, dictamin6 que el principio de un fundado temor de persecuci6n segun el Acta sobre Refugiados de 1980 es diferente y mis generoso que aqu~l de 'clara probabilidad' o de probabilidad relativa impuesto por las autoridades administrativas. Este articulo examina las evoluciones posteriores en la toma de decisiones concernientes al asilo por parte del Board of Immigration Appeals (Consejo de Apelaciones de Inmigraci6n) y establece su paralelo en laJurisprudencia de ]a Corte de Apelaciones de Estados Unidos para el Ninth Circuit (Circuito Noveno). Muchos contaban con que ]a decisi6n de la Corte Suprema conduciria a aumentar la atenci6n prestada a los problemas de credibilidad y de discreci6n; de hecho, si bien es cierto que la credibilidad es afin importante, el dmbito de la discreci6n se ha visto reducido y se han adoptado enfoques mis restrictivos a los conceptos de persecui6n y de opini6n politica. El articulo ilustra el enfoque contrastante del Ninth Circuit, que, a sujuicio, esti m;is a tono con las realidades polfticas. Los autores sugieren que, para evitar conflictos con ]a Corte, el Board of Immigration Appeals deberfa tomar una posici6n mfis directa y mis resuelta en lo que respecta a juicios politicos y concernientes a derechos humanos en los paises de origen.
